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LIGHTNING PROTECTION OF LAUNCH FACILITIES AT KENNEDY SPACE CENTER
F.A. Fisher
Environmental Electromagnetics Unit
Corporate Research and Development
General Electric Company
ABSTRACT
The location of the Apollo Launch Complex in a
region of high lightning incidence necessitated
that protective measures be incorporated in the
design of the complex and its associated control
facilities to prevent damage or interference with
launch operations. Hazards to personnel, fuel and
electrical or electronics systems were of parti
cular concern. General Electric's High Voltage
Laboratory, under contract to NASA, designed pro
tective measures which were incorporated in the
complex. These included control of lightning
attachment points on the complex and provision of
safe conduction paths to ground, control of light
ning-induced voltages in umbilical systems by
application of shielding and circuit routing cri
teria, and protection of above and below ground
instrument and power cable runs by appropriate
shielding and grounding techniques. As a result
of these measures being incorporated in the launch
complex design, very few incidents of lightning
related interference or damage have been recorded.
The few that have occurred are associated with in
complete application of the protective criteria.

facilities. The second category of problems dealt
with the remote though more personal hazards of
electrocution of people working on the ground on
the launch towers. The third category dealt with
the more subtle hazards of damage to electrical
control and guidance equipment. One can visualize
a scenario in which lightning burns out one relay
or transistor, and because the damage remained
hidden, causes loss of an entire mission. Such a
possibility was remote because of the redundant
designs and automated checkout facilities. The
possibility of a mission hold or scrub because of
such burnout was however very real.
NUMBER OF LIGHTNING INCIDENTS TO BE EXPECTED
As a rough rule of thumb one might expect 0.25-0.50
lightning flashes to each square mile of flat ter
rain for each thunderstrom day. Since the isokeraunic level, or the number of days during the
year when thunder is heard, is about 75 at KSC
one would expect 19-38 lightning flashes per year
for each square mile or 7-15 flashes per square
kilometer. Within the confines of the launch pad
one would expect 4 to 8 lightning flashes per year.
The great majority of such flashes land in places
remote from anything connected with the launch
facilities and would be no cause for concern. The
tall structure or hydrogen dewars , however, would
intercept most lightning flashes that would other
wise terminate on the ground over a diameter sev
eral times the height of the structure. From geo
metrical considerations and past experience one
could then predict that the number of flashes in
tercepted by structures would vary with their
height as shown of Figure 1. Thus, one might ex
pect the umbilical tower to be struck 3 times per
year, the VAB to be struck 4-5 times and the hydro
gen dewar to be struck perhaps once every two years.
Most of the flashes would occur during the summer
months since historically 70 percent of the thun
derstorm days occur during the months of JuneSeptember. Rather than refine the statistics fur
ther for this paper suffice it to say that the
probability of being struck was sufficiently large
that lightning could not be ignored.

INTRODUCTION
The launch facilities for the Apollo vehicles,
being located on a flat plain in a region of high
thunderstorm incidence, were early recognized as
prime targets for lightning flashes. In 1962
there was formed a lightning study team composed
of representatives from the various NASA branches
with the aim of assessing the hazards that light
ning would present to the launch facilities and to
the flight vehicle and to study how these hazards
might be reduced or eliminated. In early 1963 a
contract was signed with the General Electric
Company's High Voltage Laboratory so that its ex
pertise in the field of lightning and lightning
protection could be brought to bear on the prob
lems. The purpose of this paper is to give a re
view of the hazards that lightning presented, to
discuss how lightning protection facilities were
incorporated into the design of the launch facili
ties and to review the performance of those pro
tective features.
There were three major categories of possible ef
fects that lightning might produce. The first was
the potentially catastrophic accident if lightning
were to ignite the great quantities of propellants
in the vicinity, either by a direct flash to a
fueled vehicle or by a flash to the fuel storage

PROTECTION OF TOWERS AND VEHICLE AT LAUNCH SITE
Interception of the Lightning Flash
The choices open to the lightning protection team
were either to prevent lightning from occurring, to
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divert it away from places where it might cause
damage or to make all structures immune to a di
rect lightning flash. There were several concepts
whereby electrification might be eliminated and
so lightning prevented from developing, but few of
them had ever been tried, let alone proven to be
effective. Accordingly it was early decided that
it was impractical to try to prevent lightning and
that one could only divert lightning or live with
it.
A number of schemes were considered whereby light
ning might be diverted away from the launch pad.
The most practical of these was to erect one or
two guyed towers alongside the launch pad. Two
towers each about 550 feet (165 meters) high would
have provided the best protection. All the evi
dence indicated that such towers would indeed keep
lightning flashes from hitting the vehicle or um
bilical tower while located on the launching pad.
Such towers however could not have protected the
vehicle while it was being transported from the
VAB to the launch pad unless they were near the
vehicle on their own mobile transporters. This
would have entailed a prohibitive expense. Also
considered were guyed balloons, which in prin
ciple at least could be flown from trucks driving
alongside the vehicle while in transit or parked
permanently on the launch pad. These, too were
unattractive because of their cost and because of
the operational difficulties of keeping the bal
loons in their desired positions, regardless of
the direction of the wind.
The most practical type of protection seemed to be
to use the umbilical tower itself to intercept the
lightning flash and insure that no flash would
strike the vehicle directly. This was feasible
since the umbilical tower was sufficiently massive
that no conceivable lightning flash would damage
the tower itself.
The criterion used to determine whether a flash
would terminate on an object or be diverted to
an adjacent higher structure was the time honored
cone of protection concept. This concept, proven
by experience since Franklin's day, is illus
trated on Figure 2. It simply states that an ob
ject of height, h, will attract to itself light
ning flashes and prevent nearby and lower objects
from being hit it they lie within a cone centered
on the taller object and having a base radius
equal to the height of the taller object. This
concept assumes the protecting object is a good
conductor and not a poor conductor like a tree.
An object just outside such a cone however is not
completely exposed to lightning. The protective
range of a given object extends for a radius sev
eral times its height, with the degree of protec
tion becoming less the further one is away from
the protecting object. Substantial protection is
still provided for objects inside a cone having a
base radius twice the height of the protecting
object. Accordingly an extension of the cone of
protection concept was developed as shown on
Figure 3. This stated that protection equivalent
to a 1:1 cone would be provided an object covered
by overlapping 2:1 cones produced by two

protecting objects.
When the concept of a 1:1 cone was applied to the
original designs of the vehicle and the umbilical
tower it would found that the escape rocket and a
portion of the command module were not within a
1:1 cone when the service structure was rolled
away from the pad and the vehicle was ready for
firing. Such a configuration would occur when the
vehicle was fully fueled and probably manned.
This would be the period when a flash to the vehi
cle would cause the greatest concern. While the
probability of the vehicle being struck was low it
could be reduced even further by increasing the
height of the umbilical tower. This was most
easily done by putting a 90 foot tower atop the
crane on the umbilical tower. Figure 4 shows the
shielded regions with and without the tower. In
cidentally this tower had to be hinged at the base
so it could be lowered when the umbilical tower
was taken inside the VAB.
When the mobile service structure was parked adja
cent to the umbilical tower the vehicle was
shielded even more completely.
Conduction of Current to Ground
Assuming the umbilical tower to be struck by a
lightning flash the surge currents of 20,000 200,000 amperes had to be conducted to ground and
dissipated in the earth. In principle one could
use an insulated conductor from the top of the
tower in an attempt to keep the lightning currents
out of the umbilical tower or the vehicle. In
practice this cannot successfully be done since
it would require a conductor insulated suffi
ciently that it could withstand several million
volts, insulation equivalent 15-30 feet of air.
While such insulation could be provided the flow
of current along an insulated lightning conductor
would still induce large currents in the adjacent
umbilical tower. Accordingly the lightning mast
atop the umbilical tower was solidly connected to
the crane body and the lightning current permitted
to flow down the legs of the umbilical tower.
Not all the current however flows down the tower.
Since the umbilical arms provide electrical paths
between the tower and the vehicle a portion of
the lightning current will flow to ground through
the skin of the vehicle. The manner in which the
current divides has been studied both by means of
tests on small scale geometric models and by means
of equivalent circuits. A typical pattern is shown
on Figure 5. The significant point to observe is
that currents of tens of thousands of amperes may
flow across the umbilical arms onto the vehicle.
While these currents appear large, they are, by
virtue of short duration, easily carried by even
very small conductors. The legs of the umbilical
tower or the structural members of the umbilical
arms can carry any conceivable lightning current
with impunity. Accordingly there was no necessity
for copper lightning conductors running the length
of the umbilical tower and none, in fact, were used.
The lightning current thus flowed down the legs of
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the umbilical tower onto the umbilical tower plat
form and from there onto the support pedestals and
into the ground grid.

MISCELLANEOUS LIGHTNING PROTECTION PROBLEMS

Grounding

During the time the vehicle was being moved from
the VAB to the launch pad it was as much a target
for lightning as it was at the launch pad. The
vehicle itself was shielded by the umbilical tower
and so the problems of interception of the flash
while in transit were no different than when
mounted at the pad. Grounding however is diffi
cult to achieve. Consideration was given to vari
ous types of sliding contacts between the trans
porter and buried rails or buried cables. None
of these proved to be necessary since if the light
ning flash could jump several thousand feet
through the air to the umbilical tower it could
easily jump another few feet between the crawler
tracks and the low resistance soil underlying the
crushed rock upon which the crawler treads rested.
Such an arcing contact to ground required that the
crawler, the umbilical tower, the vehicle and all
the checkout equipment contained in the mobile
launcher be elevated during a strike to several
hundred thousand volts above the potential of the
surrounding ground. This however presented no
hazards since none of the electronic equipment in
either the vehicle or the launcher was connected
to points remote from the local ground. All of
the electrical equipment in the launcher would re
main at the potential of the launcher, regardless
of what that potential was relative to the poten
tial of the nearby soil into which the lightning
flash is discharging. Thus, as long as there were
no circuit connections from the vehicle or launcher
to remote points the voltages on the electrical
equipment within the vehicle and the launcher would
be the same regardless of how well or poorly the
launcher itself was connected to earth. Sparking
from the treads of the transporter was then not,
per se, harmful.

Grounding of the Crawler while in Transit

An extensive ground grid was provided around the
launch pad. This was formed through the use of
buried conductors or counterpoise connected to
driven ground rods. In general, the ground rods
were driven sufficiently deep to achieve a one ohm
ground resistance. Figure 6 shows some of the
locations where ground rods and counterpoise were
originally planned. During construction numerous
extra ground rods were driven so that the grounding
grid was even more extensive than shown here.
CONTROL OF TRANSIENT VOLTAGES
The changing electromagnetic fields associated
with the flow of lightning current can induce
dangerous transient voltages on control wiring if
the wiring is routed incorrectly or if improper
shielding and grounding practices are used. The
fundamental problem is shown on Figure 7. The
flow of current across the umbilical arm (I-j_) or
down the legs of the tower (I2 ) produce changing
magnetic fields (01 and 02) in the regions surroundring the control wires. By Lenz's law these chang
ing magnetic fields produce voltages
total =

+ ML

between the wires and the structural steel. These
voltages divide inversely according to the circuit
impedances at the ends of the wire, appearing in
this case as the two line -to -ground voltages V^ and
¥2. These could easily have amplitudes of thousans of volts. These voltages were controlled by
providing shields on all control wiring. These
shields took two forms;
1.

All wiring exposed to the magnetic fields of
lightning was carried in cables having an over
all braided shield.

2.

This overall shield was grounded, at each end ,
to the structural steel framework of the um
bilical tower onto the side of the vehicle.
This shield was not grounded to any sort of
insulated or low noise or single point ground.

3.

Cables running up the umbilical tower were
contained in shielded cable trays.

Uncontrolled sparking however was not desired,
mostly because there was a remote possiblity of
sparking between the transporter and a cable tray
system that was originally planned to be built
immediately adjacent to the crawler way. In order
to provide a controlled sparkover path to ground
there was provided a continuous counterpoise wire
buried just under the ground in the center of the
crawler way. Over this was then dragged a chain
fastened to the crawler. In the event of a light
ning flash to the umbilical tower any discharge
from the crawler would take place from the chain
to the counterpoise wire just below the surface of
the ground. The purpose of the chain then was not
to provide a low resistance ground for the crawler,
but only to provide a controlled sparkover path
from the crawler to the ground,

On some previous launch towers these trays were
placed along the outside of the tower. In such a
location the trays themselves would carry a sub
stantial part of the total lightning current and
were also in a region where the magnetic fields
produced by the tower current were greatest. On
Complex 39 the cable trays were deliberately lo
cated within the tower where the magnetic fields
produced by current flowing down the tower were
lowest .

Protection of Cross Countrj: Gable Systems
A lightning flash, if it struck directly on a cable,
could burn through the shield and inject high cur
rents and voltages onto the internal signal con
ductors. To prevent this all above ground cable
trays were shielded by an overhead ground wire as
shown on Figure 3, The supporting post for the

8-27

ground wire was insulated from the cable trays so
that the lightning current was carried directly to
ground. This minimized the current flow through
the cable trays.
Buried cable ducts were protected with either one
or two bare copper ground cables buried about a
foot above the cable ducts.
PERFORMANCE OF THE LIGHTNING PROTECTION SYSTEM
There have been a number of lightning flashes to
the launch facilities at KSC, ranging from a
stroke while the first test vehicle was being
transferred from the VAB to the pad to five
flashes while Apollo 15 was on the pad. None of
the flashes terminated on the vehicle; all of them
terminated on either the umbilical tower or the
service structure. There were of course the two
flashes to Apollo 12, but these occurred after the
vehicle was in flight. There have been no in
stances of fire or physical damage and no personnel
injuries caused by any of the lightning flashes.
There were several cases of damage to electronic
equipment caused by the flashes associated with
Apollo 15. This damage however all seemed to be
associated with systems in which cable shields
were not properly made. As mentioned earlier it
is of prime importance that all cables exposed to
the electromagnetic fields be fitted with overall
shields that are continuous and are grounded at
each end. On those systems that were damaged
either the continuity of the overall shield had
been broken by omission of jumpers in terminal
boxes or the overall shield had not been grounded
to the structural steel at each end. Equipment
consoles identical to those damaged, but connected
to properly made cable systems were not damaged,
even though they were exposed to the same light
ning strokes.
ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure 1 - Expected Flash Rate as a Function of
Height.
Figure 2 - A 1:1 Cone of Protection.
Figure 3 - Two Overlapping 2:1 Cones of Protection.
Figure 4 - Shielded Regions with and without the
Added Lightning Mast.
Figure 5 - Manner in which Stroke Current Divides,
Figure 6 - Launch Area Ground Rod Locations.
Figure 7 - Voltages Induced by Electromagnetic
Fields.
Figure 8 - Lightning Protection of Cable Trays,
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